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Abstract
The successful matching model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides seems to find
its hardest task in explaining the cyclical movements of some key labor market variables
such as the vacancy rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Several authors have
discussed mechanisms compatible with the matching technology that are able to deliver
the kind of correlations observed in the data. In this paper we explore four such addi-
tional mechanisms embedded in a full blown SDGE model. We find that price rigidity
greatly improves the model's empirical performance making it capable of reproducing
second moments of the data. Other components such as intertemporal substitution, en-
dogenous match destruction, capital accumulation and distortionary taxes also play a
relevant role.
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1. Introduction
The Mortensen and Pissarides model provides an engaging explanation of the determi-
nants of unemployment dynamics (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and the refer-
ences therein). While the model has gained widespread acceptance as a theory of the
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Natural Rate of unemployment its implications for the dynamics of some key labor mar-
ket variables at the business cycle frequency are less well accepted. In a widely cited
paper, Shimer (2005) argues that the model is incapable of reproducing the volatility of
unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment (v/u)r a t i oo b s e r v e di nt h e
data for a reasonable parameter calibration.T h i si sm o s tu n f o r t u n a t e ,a st h eM o r t e n s e n
and Pissarides model has become the workhorse for introducing unemployment and la-
bor market frictions in a coherent and yet tractable way in dynamic general equilibrium
models. Several authors have looked at this issue in more detail and found that the abil-
ity of the model to match data moments can be enhanced by enlarging the model in
different directions (for example, Mortensen and Nagypál, 2005, Hall, 2005, or Costain
and Reiter, 2005). A very promising line of research has emphasized the role of wage
rigidity as a means of overcoming the shortcomings of the basic model (Bodart, Pier-
rard and Sneessens, 2005). In particular Gertler and Trigari (2005) forcefully argue that
nominal wage stickiness in the form of a Calvo (1983) adjustment process of the Nash
bargaining wage moderates the volatility of real wages making labor market variables
more volatile.
In this paper we take an alternative stance and approach the issue in a com-
plementary way. Like Gertler and Trigari (2005) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000), we argue that the model performance at business cycle frequency can be greatly
improved by embedding the basic search and matching model in a broader general equi-
librium framework, but we stick to the assumption of wage flexibility and explore other
mechanisms instead, namely, endogenous separation rates, price rigidity, intertemporal
substitution, capital and taxes. These seemingly unrelated features may have different or
even offsetting effects on the model's capability to match the data but have, nonetheless,
something in common: they all bring the model closer to a state-of-the-art SDGE model
and thus provide a richer framework to assess the usefulness of the search and matching
structure to explain the data. Besides, each of these mechanisms is relevant on its own.
Endogenous separation seems the right choice if we want to give firms an additional
margin with which to optimize and adjust employment in the presence of technology
shocks. Price rigidity might contribute to smoothing out the response of real wages.
Real interest rate fluctuations affect the present value of future surpluses. Capital accu-
mulation is a key component of a model of business cycle fluctuations whose interaction
with the labor market cannot be ignored. Finally, distortionary taxes influence the re-
sponse of investment and the net values of surpluses, thus affecting unemployment and
vacancies.
O u rm a i nr e s u l ti st h a tp r i c er i g i d i t yi sc r itical for the model to deliver the kind
of volatility observed in vacancies and the unemployment vacancy ratio. We see pricePRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 3
rigidity as mechanism akin to that of wage stickiness. Following positive supply shocks,
rigid prices generate large swings in the mark-up of those firms posting vacancies and
then in the surplus of matches. As the expected value of a match increases so do va-
cancies, thus leading to higher volatility than under flexible prices. Other components
of the model play a relevant but lesser role in quantitative terms. First, as expected,
endogenous separation does reduce the volatility of vacancies; instead of posting new
vacancies firms may reduce the amount of endogenous destruction, thus making vacan-
cies less sensitive to technology shocks. Second, the degree of intertemporal substitution
affects the fall in the real interest rate induced by a positive technology shock, thus
affecting the value of a vacancy. Third, when capital and labor are complementary in-
puts, the presence of capital as a production factor significantly strengthens the response
of the surplus to technology shocks and the opening of new jobs beomes more attrac-
tive. Finally, distortionary taxes also increase the volatility of both unemployment and
vacancies.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s . I ns e c t i o nI Iw eo u t l i n eag e n e r a l
version of the model used in the paper. In section III we present the empirical evidence
and discuss the calibration in detail. Section IV presents the main results summarized
above and section V concludes.
2. The model
There are three types of agents in this economy: firms, workers and the government.
The model embeds Mortensen and Pissarides trading technology in the labor market into
a fairly general equilibrium model with capital and sticky prices.
2.1 Households
Households maximize the β discounted present value of the following utility function,
Uit (c∗
it,A i)=U (c∗















and h is a parameter that if different from zero indicates the presence of consumption
habits, Ai stands for the disutility of working with χi =1if the worker is employedPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 4




































where cit stands for consumption, eit for investment, Mit are money holdings, Bit bond
holdings, rt the real return on capital, it nominal interest rate and Ωij is the share of
profits from the jth retail sector firm that flows to household i.   gu is the unemployment
benefit, gs
i is a lump sum transfer from the government, kit−1 is the stock of capital at
the end of period t − 1 held by household i, yl
it represents household's disposable real
labor income (see definition below) and Ms
it the monetary transfers from the government
(in aggregate Ms
t =( Mt − Mt−1)). The model has taxes on capital (τk
t) and labor (τw
t )
incomes, and consumption (τc
t).
Money is required to make transactions,
Pt (1 + τc
t)cit ≤ Mit−1 + Ms
it (5)
and households accumulate capital for which they have to pay installation costs φt and
then rent it to firms at the rental cost rt
kit =( 1− δ)kit−1 + φtkit−1 (6)





. We further assume that households are homogenous and that
they pool their incomes at the end of the period. Symmetry in consumption allows us
to drop the i subscript for the remainder of the paper.








































where λ1t+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint, λ2t+1 is
the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the CIA constraint and λ3t+1 is the Lagrangian
multiplier associated to the law of motion of capital. From (10) and (11) we obtain that,
λ2t = it−1λ1t (12)
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2.2 The retail sector
Households and the government demand a single final good yt for consumption and
investment. yt is a composite of different varieties produced by monopolistically com-
petitive retail firms with elasticity of substitution θ.E a c h  jth retail firm buys the output
of wholesale firms at the price Pw
t ; this price is common to all wholesale firms since that
sector is competitive. Then retail firms convert this output in a variety yh jt that is sold
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and the aggregate price is given by:
Pt =









Prices are sticky in the retail sector. Following Calvo (1983), each period a random
fraction of firms adjust prices. Let P∗
t be the optimal price of the representative firm



























that firms in the retail sector face, i.e. the
inverse of the marginal cost, and Λt,t+s is the firm's discount rate, i.e., the pricing kernel


















Firms in the intermediate perfectly competitive wholesale sector carry out the actual




where kjt is the amount of capital (capital-labor ratio) optimally decided by the firm, zt
is a common aggregate autocorrelated shock with parameter ρz and ajt is a firm specific
productivity shock. Both shocks have a mean of 1. Nominal income at t is Pw
t   yjt but
only becomes available in period t +1 ;t h u s ,r e a li n c o m ei sg i v e nb y
P w
t
Pt+1  yjt.P r e s e n t
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Let us normalize the population to 1. Matching and production take place in
period t. At the beginning of period t some workers and firms are matched while others
are not. In particular, workers start period t either matched (nt) or unmatched (1−nt).
Some of these matches are destroyed throughout this period while others are created.
U n m a t c h e df i r m sa n dt h o s ew h o s em a t c hi ss e v e r e da tt h a tp e r i o dd e c i d ew h e t h e ro rn o t
to post a vacancy. This decision is studied later. Posted vacancies are visited randomly
by unemployed workers and all visited vacancies are occupied so that a new match
occurs.
In period t not all matches become productive. Before production takes place there
is an exogenous probability ρx of match finishing, so only (1 − ρx)nt matches survive
this exogenous selection. Surviving matches observe the realization of the random firm
specific productivity shock ait. If ait is larger than some (endogenous) threshold   at then
the match becomes a productive firm, otherwise (ait <   at) the match is severed with
probability
ρn
jt = I(  at)=
  i ajt
−∞
ϕ(ajt)dajt = I (  ajt) (25)





=( 1 -ρx)(1-I (  ajt)) where
ρjt = ρx +( 1− ρx)ρn
jt is the proportion of matches that do not survive.
The unemployment rate is given by ut ≡ (1−nt)+ρtnt workers are unemployed
during this period. Notice that employment and unemployment do not add up to 1 since
the unemployment rate we consider here is neither the beginning nor the end of period
rate but rather the amount of workers that have been unemployed at some point during
period t. Unemployed workers are actively looking for vacancies that will eventually
become productive (if they ever do) in t +1 .
The number of new matches in period t is ϑ, so that the total number of matches
evolves according to:
nt+1 =( 1− ρt)nt + ϑ (26)
The number of matches in period t depends on the amount of vacancies posted and
unemployed workers looking for jobs. The mapping from ut and vt into the number
of matches is given by an aggregate matching function ϑ(ut,v t) . The probability of aPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 8













Let us look at the choices taken throughout this process in more detail. When a
vacancy is visited the job offer is accepted and if the match is not severed, either because











where xt is the expected current value of future payoffs obtained if the relationship
continues into the next period. A match continues if the expected payoff (29) compensates
for the loss of alternative opportunities available to firms, government and workers.
There are no alternative opportunities for firms or the government and the alternative
o p p o r t u n i t i e sf o rw o r k e r si st h ev a l u ei fu n e m p l o y e dwu
jt,w h e r ewu
jt =   gu +wu
jt, wu
jt is
the present value of future worker opportunities if unemployed in period t to be defined
below and   gu represents unemployment compensation.















that is evaluated at   k∗
jt that represents the optimal value of capital had   ajt occurred.

































t = xt − wu
t as the expected excess value of a match that continues into




















Wage is determined as a result of a Nash bargaining process whereby the surplus is split
among the worker and the firm according to the relative bargaining power of each side.
In particular a proportion η of the surplus will be received by the worker, who pays
τw
t+1ηs∗
jt+1 in taxes, while the firm receives 1−η of the match surplus. Hence total after





















The firm will receive (1 − η)s∗
jt+1 + rt+1k∗
jt+1 that is used to pay the rental cost of
capital and vacancy posting costs. Total production can be obtained by adding up total
rents.
An unemployed worker in t f i n d sam a t c hw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yρw
t . With probability
1−ρw
t (1−ρt+1) the worker either fails to make a match or makes a match that does not
produce in t+1. In either case the worker only receives wu
t+1. The expected discounted





















F o ra ne x i s t i n gm a t c h ,t h em a t c hp r o d u c e si nt +1with probability 1 − ρt+1.I n t h i s
case the worker will receive yl
t+1 net of taxes. For a worker and firm already matched
2 Note that recursivity in equation (37)i m p l i e sap e r m a n e tf l o wo fi n c o m ef r o mh g
u that should
be taken into account in the calibration.PRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 10









with probability 1 − ρt+1,a n dwu
t+1, with probability ρt+1.T h i sa l l o w su st ow r i t et h e





































Unmatched firms or those whose matches terminated may enter the labor market
and post a vacancy. Posting a vacancy costs γ per period and the probability of filling
a vacancy is ρ
f

























t (1 − η)
−   gu (41)






jtϕ(at)dat = kit−1 (42)
where the left hand side indicates the demand for capital to produce in t and the right
hand side is the supply of capital available to produce in t derived from (7) to (11).
For aggregation we have to take into account that the specific shock can be dif-
ferent for each firm. Thus, aggregation requires a double integral, one for all possible
realizations of the specific shock and the other for all firms that actually produce. The
result of the latter integral gives the number of active matches (1 − ρt)nt,w h e r e a st h e
former integral can be interpreted as the average realization of the shock. Therefore
aggregate output net of vacancy costs of the wholesale sector is obtained from:






1 − I (  at)












where we have considered that the distribution function for aj is common across firms








1 − I(  at)
da (45)








1 − I(  at+1)
da (46)
t h ea v e r a g ej o i n ts u r p l u so ft h em a t c ha tt h es t a r to ft+1. Given that the expected excess









t (1 − ρt)nt (ηs∗
t + A − xu
t ) (47)




















t represents public consumption. Define bt = Bt
Pt and πt = Pt
Pt−1.G i v e n t h e
definition in aggregate for Ms
t is reduced to:





t + guut − tt (49)
To close the model it is necessary to specify both a policy rule and a monetary rule.
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There is a Taylor rule setting the nominal interest rate as a function of deviation
of inflation with respect to a target inflation rate πt:
it = ρiit−1 +( 1− ρi)
 




In order to analyze the main quantitative implications of our model, we have obtained
a numerical solution of the steady state as well as of the log-linearized system (see
Appendixes 1 to 3).
Parameter values are chosen so that the baseline solution replicates the steady state
U.S. economy. The calibrated parameters and exogenous variables appear in Table 1 and
the implied steady state in Table 2. The calibration strategy begins by solving for ρ, u, v,
  a and ν0 (the scale parameter in the matching function) using the steady-state equations
(see Appendix 2). To obtain these five unknown variables we need to set the steady state
values of some endogenous variables. Thus n has been set to the sample average, 0.9433
and the mean quarterly separation rate is approximately 0.09 (Hall, 2005). Given that
n =0 .9433 and ρ =0 .09 imply that in steady-state the average rate of workers looking
f o raj o bw i t h i ne a c hq u a r t e ri su =0 .142,t h e nρn = uρw implies a value of ρw equal
to 0.6.T h i sv a l u eo fρw,w h i c ha p p l i e st ou, is consistent with a value of 1.479 of the
quarterly job-finding rate which applies to the average US unemployment rate, slightly
higher than the value of 1.35 estimated by Shimer (2005). Also form the steady-state
condition ρfv = ρwu and using data from JOLTS in which the average 2001:1 to 2004:3
ratio v/(1−n) equals 0.58, we derive ρf =2 .58, which implies that a vacancy is open on
average 5 weeks. We assume that ρx =0 .072 that implies that the exogenous separation
rate is 80 per cent of the total separation rate, a number between the one assumed by
den Haan et al. (2000) but smaller than the one implied by Hall (2005) who suggests
that the total separation rate is almost completely acyclical. Finally, we assume that a
follows a log normal distribution with standard deviation of 0.10, the same as den Haan
et al. (2000). We set the share of the match surplus that the worker receives (η)e q u a lt o
2/3,b e t w e e n0.5 (Walsh, 2005) and 0.72 (Shimer, 2005). With these numbers equations
(2.1) to (2.5) imply that   a =0 .8133 and ν0 =1 .075.
T h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r sa r es e tt oc o n ventional values. In particular we take
from Walsh (2005) the following parameters: the discount rate (β), the risk aversion
(σ), the elasticity of demand of differentiated goods (θ) and habits (h). Government
consumption (gc/y), investment (gp/y)a n dt r a n s f e r so v e rG D P( gs/y) are set to historical
average values. Capital and consumption tax rates have been taken from Boscá, GarcíaPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 13
and Taguas (2005), whereas τw has been calibrated to obtain a debt to GDP ratio equal
to 2 at quarterly frequency. For simplicity, unemployment benefits are assumed to be





where rr =0 .26, taken from the average value from1960 to 1995 in Blanchard and
















The elasticity of output to private capital (α)i s0.4 and the depreciation rate (δ)i s
0.02. Capital adjustment costs are assumed to satisfy the following properties: φ−1 (δ)





=1 . Therefore, in steady state equation (2.9) implies q =1 , which allows
equations (2.19) and (2.8) to be rewritten as:






r + β (1 − δ) (56)
Capital adjustment costs (Φ = φ00(e/k))a r ee q u a lt o−0.25 as in Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999).
Since the discount factor (β)i s0.989, following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992),




− 1=0 .011 (57)
The rental cost of capital is obtained from expression (56)
r =
1 − β (1 − δ)
β
 
1 − τk  (58)
The elasticity of demand for the differentiated retail goods is set equal to 11, as in denPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 14





The values of i, r and µ can be plugged in equation (2.11) to obtain the steady













given the steady-state values of n, k
∗
and   a, we can use equation (2.12) to obtain the
aggregate capital stock
k =( 1− ρx)nk
∗
(1 − I (  a)) (61)
whereas equation (2.13) gives ki. Using the steady-state values of µ, k
∗
,   a, r and i,
equation (2.14) can be solved for A allowing us to calibrate γ to satisfy equation (2.17).
Then, given n, k
∗
,   a and γ, the production function gives the steady-state value of output
net of vacancy costs, which are equal to 0.6 per cent of GDP.
Since the steady-state investment is given by equation (55), the aggregate resource
constraint allows to obtain private consumption c,m a k i n gi tp o s s i b l et os o l v ef o rλ in
expression (2.21) and m in expression (2.22). Finally, xu, s∗, yl, t and b can be solveb
recursively in equations (2.15) to (2.25).
Some relevant parameters cannot be obtained from the steady-state relationships.
Thus, we adopt a value of 0.7 for ω close to empirical estimates of the average duration
of price stickiness (Gali and Gertler, 1999, Sbordone, 2002), whereas for inflation index-
ation we take an intermediate value (ς =0 .5). As regards the fiscal policy, we assume
that only transfers respond to debt deviations from the target so that the dynamics of
the all others variables are unaffected; this implies that ψs
1 is the only parameter of the
fiscal rule initially set different to zero. The parameters in the interest rule are standard
in the literature: ρi =0 .75, ρπ =1 .50 and ρy =0 . Finally the standard deviation of pro-
ductivity shocks (σz) and its autocorrelation parameter (ρz) are calibrated to reproduce
the average historical volatility and autocorrelation of the US output gap.
The model with transitory supply shocks (that is, shocks in zt) has been simulated
1000 times, with 260 observations in each simulation. We take the last 160 quarters
and compute the averages over the 1000 simulations of the standard deviation of each
variable (x)r e l a t i v et ot h a to fo u t p u t( σx/σy,e x c e p tf o rG D Pw h i c hi sj u s tσy), the
first-order autocorrelation (ρx) and the contemporaneous correlation with output (ρxy)PRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 15
TABLE 1 − PARAMETER VALUES
ν0 1.075 γ 0.500 ω 0.700
ρx 0.072 h 0.780 ς 0.500
β 0.989 gc/y 0.150 Φ -0.25
δ 0.020 gs/y 0.141 ρi 0.750
θ 11 gp/y 0.035 ρπ 1.500
α = ν 0.400 τw 0.345 ρy 0.000
rr 0.300 τk 0.350 σa 0.100
σ 2.000 τc 0.100 σz 1.700
A 1.524 η 0.666 ρz 0.402
TABLE 2 − STEADY STATE
ρ 0.090 r 0.048 λ 0.078
u 0.141 q 1.000 m/y 0.731
v 0.033 µ 1.100 xu/y 0.017
  a 0.813 k
∗
/y 8.804 s∗/y 0.193
n 0.943 k/y 7.557 b/y 2.000
ρf 2.581 y 1.000 ki/y 5.451
ρw 0.600 e/y 0.151
i 0.011 c/y 0.664
of each variable.
These moments are compared with basic labor markets facts of the US business
cycles from 1951:1 to 2005:3. The data source is basically the same as in Shimer (2005). We
use FRED Economic Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for unemployment,
the help wanted index and civilian employment . As the frequency of these data is
monthly, we compact the data set by taking quarterly averages. The real quarterly GDP
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of
the Department of Commerce. We take logs of these quarterly variables and obtain their
cyclical components using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal
to 1600.3
3 We have checked that we obtain the same results as in Shimer (2005) if the analysed period








0.012  0.022  0.032  0.042  0.052 
Vacancy rate
γ=0.5
Figure 1: Free entry condition.
4. Results
The results discussed in this section can be explained with the help of two critical expres-
sions in the model: the free entry condition for posting vacancies (40) and the related
definition of the surplus (34). Figure 1 represents the free entry condition as a negative
function of vacancies, holding constant the rest of the implied variables. Vacancies en-
ter this expression through the probability of filling a vacancy ρ
f
t = ϑ(ut
vt,1),w h e r e a s
changes in other variables shift the curve thus affecting the equilibrium or the impact
response and volatility of the vacancy rate. F o ri n s t a n c e ,f o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fv a c a n -
cies, an increase in unemployment shifts the curve upwards increasing the number of
posted vacancies. Vacancy volatility would in this case depend on the magnitude of the
shift, that in turn depends on how much unemployment increased.
Both expressions (40) and (34) contain the main parameters that determine the
volatility labor market variables and that have been the subject of much discussion in
this literature. The value of non-market activities A and   gu (inside xu
jt+1)o nt h eo n e
hand, and the bargaining power of workers η, on the other hand, are the key parameters
in the calibration discussion for Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) and Costain and Reiter
(2005). Below, we first discuss some calibration issues but mainly focus on a number of
economic mechanisms that play an important role in explaining these volatilities for a
given set of parameter values. In particular, we study the effects of: (1) endogenous job
destruction; (2) intertemporal substitution; (3) price stickiness (i.e. cyclical movements
in the mark-up); (4) capital; and (5) taxes.
Endogenous destruction matters through the effect of   at+1. More specifically, thePRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 17














(1 − I (  ajt))
da = γ (1 − ρx)
A decrease in   ajt, as a consequence of a positive shock in productivity, affects the sur-
vival rate as well as the average surplus measured by the integral in the above expression.
Furthermore, the volatility of vacancies will depend on how much the general equilib-
rium real interest rate
λ1t+1
λ1t varies after a positive productivity shock. Capital, in turn,
enters (34), reducing surplus in levels and therefore making the free entry condition
more sensitive to shocks. Taxes affect both the net surplus as well as the dynamics of
investment and vacancy posting. Finally, price inertia generates an additional source of
surplus dynamics similar to that induced by real wage inertia. Some authors have fo-
cused on wage determination as a means of increasing the proportion of the observed
volatility of labor market variables that the model is able to explain, while the impor-
tance of the price formation mechanism has gone quite unnoticed. Gertler and Trigari,
2005 have looked at the role of wage rigidity, whereas Costain and Reiter (2005) have
allowed for countercyclical movements in η. With flexible prices the mark-up µt = Pt
P w
t
is almost constant in presence of technology s h o c k s ,w i t hs o m ed e g r e eo fp r i c es t i c k i -
ness the mark-up increases on impact (due to a fall in Pw
t not compensated by a fall in
Pt) and adjusts thereafter thus leading to interesting movements in s∗
jt+1 that in turn
influence current vacancy posting. We investigate these mechanisms in detail below.
4.1 A calibration qualification
The simulation results of the general model described in the previous section appear in
the last column of Table 3, as well as the empirical evidence for the United States (first
column) and the results for the simplest version of our model, which is comparable to
Shimer's (2005). Thus, the model in column (2) is a particular case of the model described
in Section 2 that assumes perfect competition in the goods market and price flexibility,
with neither capital nor government so that consumption smoothing is not possible
and in which job destruction is completely exogenous. In column (2) we present the
r e s u l t so ft h i sm o d e lu s i n gS h i m e r ' s calibration for vacancy cost (γ =0 .213),t h er a t eo f
discount (1/β =1 .012), utility from leisure (A =0 .4), separation rate (ρ =0 .1),w o r k e r
bargaining power (η =0 .72, also equal to the matching elasticity with respect to u)a n d
the scale parameter in the matching function (ν0 =1 .355) and choosing the variance and
autocorrelation of technology shocks (σz and ρz) to reproduce these second moments
i nt h ec a s eo fG D P .A sw ec a ns e ei nc o l u m n( 2 ) ,w ec o r r o b o r a t eS h i m e r ' sr e s u l t s :t h e
basic search and matching model generates relative volatilities of unemployment andPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 18









(1) (2) (3) (4)
  yt σy 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.58
ρy 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84
lnut σu/σy 7.83 0.40 5.74 8.92
ρu 0.87 0.70 0.84 0.83
σu,y -0.84 -0.83 -0.99 -0.91
lnvt σv/σy 8.85 1.18 4.33 9.72
ρv 0.91 0.70 0.37 0.29
σv,y 0.90 0.97 0.71 0.55
ln vt
ut σvu/σy 16.33 1.46 9.35 14.51
ρvu 0.90 0.82 0.67 0.68
σvu,y 0.89 0.99 0.94 0.93
ρw σρw/σy 4.86 0.42 3.23 4.35
ρρw 0.91 0.83 0.67 0.69
σρw,y 0.99 0.94 0.94
vacancies which are respectively 20 and 7.5 times smaller than those observed in the
data.
In column (3) we present the results for this basic model but with a different
calibration. In particular, we choose the same values of parameters as in Table 1, except
the utility from leisure (A =0 .889, which implies a surplus in steady state equal to 23.2
per cent of output) and the vacancy cost (γ =0 .191) calibrated to reproduce the same
steady state employment and job-finding rates as in Table 2 with the basic search model
with exogenous job destruction (ρn =0 ). Both the unemployment rate and vacancies
become more volatile than in column (2) with this calibration and the volatility of the v/u
ratio also improves accordingly. This result confirms previous findings in the literature
(see, for example, Costain and Reiter, 2005, and Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2005) that
point out that Shimer's results are somewhat sensitive to calibration. Nevertheless, the
volatilities of this basic search and matching model are still far from those observed in
the data.
In contrast to the basic model, column (4) offers the main result of the paper: a
more realistic model with capital, distortionary taxes and price rigidities can match mostPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 19
dimensions of the cyclical patterns of the US labor market. In particular, the volatility of
unemployment, vacancies, and market tightness of the artificial economy are very close
to those observed in the data. Notice that in this model the value of A over output is
equal to 0.456 in steady state, close to the value used by Shimer (2005).
There are many differences between our general model and Shimer's (2005) mak-
ing it difficult to gauge the contribution of the different components of the model in
explaining the improvement in empirical performance. The rest of this section is de-
voted to exploring these mechanisms in detail, by taking each of them at a time from the
basic to the more general specification. Gi v e nt h ec o m p l e x i t yo ft h em o d e la n dt h ea b -
sence of an analytical solution this can be only done by relying on numerical simulations
and analyzing the sensitivity of the results in each particular case.
4.2 Exogenous versus endogenous job destruction
In Table 4 we present the results of the basic model with (when ρn > 0)a n dw i t h o u t
endogenous job destruction (ρn =0 ), holding constant all parameters in our model. As
we observe, when we introduce endogenous job destruction (that amounts to 1.9 per
cent in steady state, representing 21.5 per cent of the total quarterly separation rate)
the model predicts higher relative volatility in unemployment but at the cost of a lower
volatility in vacancies. This result starkly contrasts with that obtained by Mortensen and
Nagypál (2005) who find that endogenous separation increases the volatility of vacancies.
Several effects explain our result. When there is endogenous job destruction and
the economy is hit by a positive shock to total factor productivity, the markup does
not change (as prices are flexible), whereas the positive innovation in zt allows firms to









− rt  k∗
jt
⎤
⎦ − A + xjt − wu
jt =0 (62)
This reduces the rate of (endogenous) job destruction making the fall in unemployment
larger when ρn > 0. But the larger fall in unemployment (relative to that under exoge-
nous destruction) makes vacancy posting less attractive because the probability of filling
a vacancy is lower (i.e. the upwards shift of the left hand side of expression (40) in
Figure 1 is lower in this case.
Moreover, the response of the expected surplus is lower under endogenous de-
struction due to two offsetting mechanisms: first, since the shock in zt is persistent there
is an expected fall in   ajt+1 so that matches remain active under worse firm-specific con-
ditions; and second, the probability of a vacancy surviving in the future increases inPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 20






ρn =0 ρn > 0
(1) (2) (3)
  yt σy 1.58 1.58 1.58
ρy 0.84 0.85 0.84
lnut σu/σy 7.83 5.73 6.56
ρu 0.87 0.84 0.83
σu,y -0.84 -0.99 -0.99
lnvt σv/σy 8.85 4.33 2.13
ρv 0.91 0.37 0.16
σv,y 0.90 0.71 0.23
ln vt
ut σvu/σy 16.33 9.35 7.42
ρvu 0.90 0.67 0.67
σvu,y 0.89 0.94 0.95
ρw σρw/σy 4.86 3.23 2.31
ρρw 0.91 0.67 0.67
σρw,y 0.93 0.95
good times. While the first effect diminishes the incentive to post a new vacancy the




thus moderating the increase in current vacancy posting. While Mortensen and Nagypál
(2005) only allow in their model for the later effect, thus finding that endogenous destruc-
tion increases the volatility of the v/u ratio, in our model endogenous separation creates
an additional margin in which the firm can decide without too much of a response from
vacancies to technology shocks. Thus the volatility of vacancies falls.
4.3 Intertemporal substitution and price rigidities
We next analyze three key elements in the dynamics of most macroeconomic variables.
The matching mechanism is embedded within a more general dynamic model in which
agents take their intertemporal decisions by operating through a perfect financial mar-
ket. We also include habits in consumption as well as price stickiness to enhance the
intertemporal nature of decisions taken by households and firms. We first consider
Walsh's (2005) model (which is similar to Trigari, 2004), that incorporates intertempo-
ral substitution, price rigidity and habits, but omits capital and distortionary taxes. In
column (2) of Table 5 we present the main results in terms of volatilities of this modelPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 21
TABLE 5 − VOLATILITIES
NOMINAL PRICE RIGIDITIES












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  yt σy 1.58 1.58 3.27 2.36 2.15 1.58
ρy 0.84 0.94 0.85 0.91 0.77 0.84
lnut σu/σy 7.83 9.37 10.65 10.04 9.37 8.92
ρu 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.91 0.79 0.83
σu,y -0.84 -0.94 -0.95 -0.98 -0.97 -0.91
lnvt σv/σy 8.85 6.28 2.93 4.83 6.82 9.72
ρv 0.91 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.29
σv,y 0.90 0.41 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.55
ln vt
ut σvu/σy 16.33 11.71 11.83 12.56 13.76 14.51
ρvu 0.90 0.89 0.69 0.82 0.53 0.68
σvu,y 0.89 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.93
ρw σρw/σy 4.86 3.61 3.21 3.72 3.96 4.35
ρρw 0.91 0.89 0.69 0.81 0.53 0.69
σρw,y 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94
using our calibrated parameters, except for σz and ρz. As we can see, this model does
a better job of fitting the relative volatilities of u, v and v/u than the basic model.
Let us first compare models in column (3) in Table 4 and column (3) in Table
5. Both models are similar except for the fact that the latter incorporates the matching
mechanism (with endogenous separation) into a standard SDGE framework, as in Walsh
(2005) and Trigari (2004) with flexible prices, σ =1and no habits in consumption.
The observed difference in volatilities stems from the influence of the intertemporal
substitution mechanism. Substituting out the first order conditions of the households














jt+1ϕ(a)da = γ (63)
A positive technology shock induces a fall in the real interest rate that raises the present
value of the expected future value of a vacancy, thus inducing a larger upward shift in
the left hand side of (63) and more job creation (more vacancies).
Unfortunately intertemporal substitution per se is insufficient for volatilities toPRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 22
approach to those observed and this artificial economy is still far from US data, explaining
only 1/3 of the actual variation in vacancies. This small improvement is not surprising as
in this model there is perfect risk sharing among employed and unemployed workers, so
the consumption of one particular household is not affected by the employment status.
T h eo n l yd i f f e r e n c ei sa tt h ea g g r e g a t el e v e l ,c a u s e db yt h er e s p o n s eo ft h er e a li n t e r e s t
rate (i.e. the subjective discount rate) in a model in which households may trade assets
in the financial market, an effect that was not present in the models in Table 4.
Two additional mechanisms help to obtain statistics that are closer to those ob-
served in the data. Column (4) of Table 5 depicts the main statistics of a model that
includes price rigidity and habits. The presence of habits reinforces the intertemporal
substitution mechanism due to the downward reaction of the real interest rate being
stronger in the case of habits. When the habit motive is strong (h =0 .78), the real inter-
est rate must fall further in order to induce households to advance consumption of the
additional output generated by the improvement in technology. Thus strong habits lead
to a stronger response of the present value of expected surpluses and, hence, vacancies.
Price rigidity turns out to be the single most important mechanism in explaining
the volatility of vacancies. The influence of this channel can be observed by comparing
the models in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 that only differ from each other in the
d e g r e eo fp r i c ei n e r t i a .I nc o l u m n( 4 )p r i c e sa r em o r ef l e x i b l ea n dt h e r ei sl e s si n f l a t i o n
indexation than in column (2) (ω =0 .7, ς =0 .5 versus ω =0 .5, ς =0respectively).
In order to understand this differencew ec a nm a k eu s eo ft h ee n t r yc o n d i t i o n
(63). After a positive technology shock the left hand side of (63) shifts upwards, thus
increasing the amount of vacancies opened in period t. Apart from the real interest
rate, two components of this equation are influenced by the degree of price stickiness in
the model. First, the mark-up (µt = Pt/Pw
t ) increases on impact, due to the downward
rigidity of Pt. However µt+1 falls once the progressively downward adjustment of prices
is underway. This fall is more intense under sticky prices than under flexible prices and
hence the response of s∗
t+1 is also stronger. Secondly, the technology shock along with
the sharp increase in µt push   ajt u ps i n c et h er e a lr e v e n u eo fi n t e r m e d i a t ef i r m si se r o d e d
by downward price rigidity in Pt. As a consequence, endogenous destruction rises and
unemployment increases. More unemployment reduces labor market tightness, hence
increasing the probability of filling a vacancy ρ
f
t when prices are less flexible. These two
effects reinforce each other and induce an upward shift on the left hand side of (63) that
is larger the higher the degree of price stickiness. Thus the volatility of vacancies and
unemployment increase substantially as prices become more rigid.PRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 23
TABLE 6 − VOLATILITIES
CAPITAL AND DISTORTIONARY TAXES
US Benchmark No capital No taxes
α =0 .01
Φ = −10 τ
j
t =0∀j
(1) (2) (3) (4)
  yt σy 1.58 1.58 1.87 1.66
ρy 0.84 0.84 0.92 0.80
lnut σu/σy 7.83 8.92 10.46 7.69
ρu 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.83
σu,y -0.84 -0.91 -0.93 -0.92
lnvt σv/σy 8.85 9.72 6.91 9.08
ρv 0.91 0.29 0.51 0.24
σv,y 0.90 0.55 0.44 0.60
ln vt
ut σvu/σy 16.33 14.51 13.17 13.35
ρvu 0.90 0.68 0.90 0.62
σvu,y 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.94
ρw σρw/σy 4.86 4.35 3.99 4.10
ρρw 0.91 0.69 0.90 0.62
σρw,y 0.94 0.97 0.94
4.4 Capital adjustment costs and distortionary taxes.
A typical assumption in the basic search and matching model is that labor is the only
input in the production function. However, as noticed by Mortensen and Nagypál (2005),
the elasticity of the v/u ratio with respect to the technology shock increases with the
capital share of output. Our definition of the surplus makes it evident why capital affects

















⎦ − A + xu
jt+1
The response of the surplus is affected by the dynamics of capital and it is therefore
worth looking at the adjustment cost of this factor (Φ). We can take Walsh (2005) and
Trigari (2004) models as a particular case in which α i ss m a l la n dc a p i t a la d j u s t m e n t
costs are high, that is, a case in which optimal capital per worker is low and changes
very slowly.
In column (3) of Table 6 we depict the effects of a smaller value of α (0.01 versus
0.4) and greater capital adjustment costs (−10 versus −0.25) than those in our bench-PRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 24
mark in column (2). First, we observe that the economy with low and persistent capital
shows a higher standard deviation of unemployment, since all adjustment after a tech-
nology shock relies on labor adjustment. Second, as capital becomes more important in
production and adjusts more quickly (column (2)), the response of s∗
jt+1 to changes in
zt becomes larger making the opening of new jobs more attractive. As a consequence of
that, the relative volatility of vacancies increases from 6.91 to 9.72 as we move from one
economy in which the capital channel is not relevant (column (3)) to another in which
capital is a significant dynamic factor of production (column (2)).4
Although of minor importance, the presence of distortionary taxation has also
some bearing on the volatility of unemployment and vacancies in our SDGE frame-
work. Distortionary taxes increase the volatility of unemployment since these reduce
t h ea f t e r - t a xv a l u eo ft h em a t c hs u r p l u s ,t h u s making firms and workers more selective
about the non-production threshold value   ajt. The probability of endogenous separa-
tion (ρn
jt) increases more following a positive shock under distortionary taxation and so
does unemployment. In addition to this, vacancies are more volatile in this case. First,
the increase in unemployment raises the probability of filling a vacancy (ρ
f
t ); second, the
higher value of   ajt+1 increases the expected value of the surplus; and finally, due to the
presence of distortionary taxation the steady-state value of capital is lower, so invest-
ment reacts more than under lump-sum taxation, and so does s∗
t+1.5 All these effects
make posting new vacancies at t more attractive to firms.
5. Concluding Remarks
In the standard search and matching model, the unemployment rate critically hinges
upon the number of vacancies posted, which in turn depends on the determinants of
the free-entry condition. This condition relates the cost of vacancy posting with the
probability of a vacancy being filled as well as with the expected surplus of the vacancy
and the discount rate. These three components are model-specific and vary to make
vacancy posting more or less responsive to a total factor productivity shock. Shimer
(2005) showed that in fact the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment (as well as the
4 We have also analyzed the sensitivity of our results to changes in Φ holding α constant. As
we increase Φ from its benchmark value (−0.25) there is a reduction in the variance of investment,
output and vacancies. But this reduction is not uniform, being greater in the case of investment
and lower in vacancies than in output. As a result the relative volatility of vacancies to output
i n c r e a s e sa sc a p i t a la d j u s t m e n tc o s t sa r el a r g e r ,b ut at the cost of a smaller relative volatility of
investment.
5 For a thorough discussion on the effects of distortionary taxation (vis-a-vis lump-sum taxes)
on the volatility of investment see Andrés and Doménech (2005) and Galí (1994).PRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 25
vacancy to unemployment ratio) predicted by the basic model are far lower than those
observed in US data.
In this paper we hace proposed a more general neo-keynesian dynamic general
equilibrium model in which the empirical predictions match the empirical evidence re-
markably well. In particular the model predicts a relative (to output) volatility of vacan-
cies, unemployment and the v/u ratio that fit those observed in the data almost perfectly.
The model also does well in explaining autocorrelations and cross correlations among
variables, although the implied persistence of vacancies is somewhat low.
Since the model has a complex structure, we carry out a detailed analysis of the
contribution of each of the main features of the model to this enhanced empirical per-
formance. Endogenous separation actually takes model predictions further away from
those observed since it opens up a channel through which firms can absorb the effects
of a positive technology shock without relying too much on new vacancy posting. All
determinants of the free entry condition and, therefore, of vacancy posting, are crucially
affected by the introduction of consumption smoothing, habits, price inertia, capital and
distortionary taxes. As the model allows for consumption smoothing and higher habits,
the discount rate falls more (than would have been the case in an economy without these
features) following a positive technology shock. Furthermore, price inertia and distor-
tionary taxes affect the matching specific threshold productivity level and the value of
future surpluses resulting in a increase in the expected value of vacancies. Finally the
presence of capital also strengthens the response of expected surpluses to technology
shocks. All these model features contribute to increase the attractiveness of new va-
cancy posting following a positive innovation to total factor productivity, thus taking
the model predictions about the volatility of vacancies, unemployment and the vacancy
to unemployment ratio to levels comparable with the empirical evidence.
One of these mechanisms turns out to be of paramount importance: price sticki-
ness. It has a direct effect on all components of the free entry condition and has proved
to be the most significant in quantitative terms. In this sense, we see our results to
be akin to those emphasizing the importance of nominal stickiness, mostly in nominal
wages, as a way of improving the empirical performance of matching models. The com-
bination of wage and price stickiness seems a natural extension aimed at both to further
improving the model and also assessing the relative importance of different sources of
nominal inertia for the purpose at hand.
A final comment on calibration is pertinent here. Our empirical analysis has
been ushered in by a thorough calibration exercise based on a careful analysis of the
existing literature on the issue, as well as of the basic steady-state variables for the US
economy. The empirical predictions of our general model are fairly robust to reasonablePRICE RIGIDITY AND THE VOLATILITY OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 26
changes in calibration values. However, we have also corroborated that the predictions
of the basic Mortensen and Pissarides model were somewhat sensitive to the choice of
parameter values. In fact the simulated moments for some parameterization, although
clearly below target, were not as far away from the empirical observation as the previous
literature suggested. This leads us to believe that more research is needed on this matter
and in particular a deep econometric analysis is called for to obtain a better empirical
c o u n t e r p a r to fs o m eo ft h ep a r a m e t e r su s e di nthis literature. This is next on the research
agenda.
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Appendix 1: Equilibrium
The dynamic equilibrium is defined by the following equations:
yt =
(1 − ρt)nt (1 + it)µtrt
α
k∗
t − γvt (1.1)
ct + et + gc

























Pt (1 + τc
t)ct = Mt (1.5)




























































t =( 1− ω)P∗1−θ
t + ωP1−θ
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ϕ(at)da (1.13)
ρt = ρx +( 1− ρx)ρn
t (1.14)
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t (1 − η)
−   gu (1.19)
yl
t =( 1− ρt)nt (1 − τw
t )[ηs∗
t + A − xu
t ] (1.20)












nt+1 =( 1− ρt)nt + ϑ(ut,v t) (1.24)
(1 − ρt)ntk∗
t = kt−1 (1.25)
it = ρiit−1 +( 1− ρi)
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Endogenous variables:ct, et, yt, λ1t, it, rt, vt, ut,   at, nt, k∗
jt, πt, Mt, Pt, qt, P∗
t , Λt, µt,
xu
t , ρn
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Appendix 2: The steady-state model
From (1.21):
u =1− (1 − ρ)n (2.1)
From (1.24):











From (1.13) and (1.14):
ρ = ρx +( 1− ρx)I (  a) (2.5)
From (1.15):
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From (1.18)6:
xu = β (1 − ρ)[1− ηρw − ητw (1 − ρw)]s∗ −
 



































































= φ−1 (δ) (2.19)
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We wish to calibrate h g
u so that the observed unemployment benefits (g
u) is received only during
two consecutive periods:
[1 + β (1 − ρ
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From (1.2):















yl =( 1− ρ)n(1 − τw)[ηs∗ + A − xu] (2.23)
From (1.27):
t = τcc + τkrtk + τw (1 − ρ)n(ηs∗ + A − xu) (2.24)
From (1.28):
gc + gs + guu + ib = t (2.25)
Exogenous variables: π and τc, τk, τw, gc, gs, gu. Endogenous:c, e, y, λ1, i, r, v, u,   a,




, ρs (25 endogenous=25 equations)
Appendix 3: Log-linearized model
Let   x be the variable that tell us how much x differs from its steady-state value.
From (1.12):
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From (1.14):












  ρt (3.4)
From (1.24):








  vt (3.5)
From (1.21):
  ut = −(1 − ρ)
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From (1.1):
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From (1.2):
  yt =
c
y
  ct +
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  Mt =   Pt +   ct (3.15)
From (1.6):
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From (1.7):
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+   Pt (3.19)
From (1.26):
i  it = ρii  it−1 +( 1− ρi)ρππ  πt +( 1− ρi)ρyy  yt (3.20)
Fom (1.9):
  P∗
t = βωEt   P∗
t+1 +( 1− βω)
 
  Pt −   µt
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From (1.30):
Et  Λt+1 =   Λt + Et
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From (1.20):
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t (3.24)
From (1.25):
  kt−1 =   nt −
ρ
1 − ρ
  ρt +   k∗
t (3.25)
New Phillips curve:
  πt =
β
1+ςβ
Et  πt+1 −
(1 − βω)(1− ω)
ω(1 + ςβ)
  µt +
ς
1+ςβ
  πt−1 (3.26)
From (1.27):
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where:
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(3.32)